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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the years to
develop the concept of what constitutes a "reasonable zone of
privacy" when it comes to intrusion on an individual's physical
space or activities. With the advent and widespread adoption of new
technologies such as drones and listening devices, concern for
protecting privacy has magnified, yet court doctrine remains
inconsistent. The author, Washington State's Chief Privacy Officer,
reviews the history of Supreme Court "search and seizure" rulings
in prominent cases to identify both patterns and flaws on the topic
of protecting citizen privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Virginia ruled en banc, by a 12-3 vote, that our most durable privacy
law—the Fourth Amendment—does not protect cell phone data
pinpointing a caller’s location.1 In this particular case, law
enforcement convicted two Baltimore men of multiple armed
robberies in 2011 by analyzing 221 days of their wireless location
data, which pinpointed 29,000 different locations.2 The court
reasoned that, because cell phone owners know that their location
information is shared with their wireless carrier, as under the thirdparty doctrine, an individual can claim "no legitimate expectation of
privacy" in information that he has voluntarily turned over to a third
party.3
The Graham ruling calls into question whether a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" exists with respect to wireless location data.
It also seems to contradict the broad pro-privacy affirmation
expressed the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley v.
1

United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he
Government's acquisition of that information (historical CSLI) pursuant to §
2703(d) orders, rather than warrants, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
2
See generally Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
3
Id. at 427 ("Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we hold
that Defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical
CSLI.").
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California, which held that police must obtain a search warrant
before opening an individual’s cell phone incident to a search.4
The definition of 'zones of privacy' has evolved over three
distinct phases of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The first phase,
from 1891-1924, involved the arcane "open fields" or “open view”
doctrine."5 The second phase, from 1928-1967, allowed for
widespread government wire-tapping, but ended with the Court’s
1967 ruling in Katz v. United States, which articulated a “reasonable
zone of privacy” standard.6 Finally, the "open fields" doctrine
reemerged in the 1980’s in conjunction with contemporary drug
cultivation operations. As a result, the Court reverted to finding no
violation of the Fourth Amendment —even in cases of intrusion on
private property.7 Examining these three eras sheds considerable
light on the privacy rights, or lack thereof, in America today.

I.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND ZONES OF PRIVACY

While the Supreme Court has historically struggled to define
a person’s reasonable zone of privacy, technology has run circles
around the judiciary. Fifteen years ago, the public had very little
expectation that private companies would take satellite photographs
to compile aerial views of every American neighborhood, down to
recognizable houses, gardens, garages, and lawns.8 Nor did people
commonly exercise property rights in vertical air space above her
4

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) ("[A] warrant is generally
required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to
arrest.).
5
The terms "open fields" and "open view" are used interchangeably in this
article, although later decisions tend to use the "open view" phrase to describe
the general doctrine.
6
Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 (1967).
7
See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1923)
8
See generally, Samuel Gibbs, Google Maps: a decade of transforming the
mapping landscape, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8 2015, 4:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/08/google-maps-10anniversary-iphone-android-street-view.
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domain extending all the way up to outer space.9 With the rapid and
widespread adoption of new technologies, lawmakers have
generally surrendered potential privacy claims to Google, Bing and
other mapping services as these technologies expanded.
Google Street View poses a closer case for privacy
advocates, in part because of how it acquires data.10 A camera-laden
car mapping a neighborhood might snap a photograph of an
individual in an embarrassing pose. This technology, however, has
widely been ruled to be legal in a variety of jurisdictions because the
mapping vehicle is using public streets and taking photos of scenery
that can otherwise be seen with the naked eye.11 In this sense,
Google’s resources and technology have logarithmically expanded
the old legal doctrine of "open view."12
U.S. law might not have permitted Google Street View,
however, had, a strange and enduring definition of a person’s home
through physical invasion or curtilage not been articulated by the
Supreme Court over eighty years ago.13

9

While the ad coelum doctrine refers to ownership of land up to the heaven and
down to the center of the earth, it had little practical application above ground
until the invention of airplanes. See Environmental Justice, Peter S. Wentz, p.
177, SUNY Press, 1988. When a man tried to claim ownership of certain rights
in asteroid Eros 433, the Ninth Circuit held that he stated no recognizable legal
claim either under common law or the Outer Space Treaty. Nemitz v United
States and or, Decision on motion to dismiss, 2004 WL 3167042 (D Nev 2004),
ILDC 1986 (US 2004), 26th April 2004, United States.
10
Alexis C. Madrigal, How Google Builds Its Maps—and What It Means for the
Future of Everything, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 9, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/09/how-google-builds-itsmaps-and-what-it-means-for-the-future-of-everything/261913/.
11
See, e.g., Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(ruling in favor of Google and dismissing privacy claims because Google Street
View were images that were in plain sight. Interestingly the court noted it would
be "hard to believe" the plaintiffs suffered "shame or humiliation.").
12
The open fields doctrine holds that persons cannot assert protection for
activities conducted in open fields because such areas are not protected places or
things under a plain language reading of the fourth amendment. See Seth H.
Ruzi, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the open view Doctrine:
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 191, 196 (1988) (citing
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1923)).
13
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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PHASE I – THE STRANGE DOCTRINE OF CURTILAGE AND
OPEN FIELDS (1891-1924)

Much of the failure of American courts to delineate
reasonable zones of privacy traces back to the historic Supreme
Court ruling in Olmstead v. United States.14 In writing for the
majority's ruling on relatively modern technology—telephones and
the government interception of telephone wire transmissions—
Chief Justice William Howard Taft drew on the ancient property
concepts that informed most privacy law in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.15 Taft concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation
does not occur unless there has been an official search and seizure
of a person’s papers, or tangible material effects.16 Further, a search
would not occur unless there was an "actual physical invasion of his
house or curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure."17
Prior to Olmstead, courts adhered to an archaic construction
of zones of privacy. One has to turn to the 1891 edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary to find a working definition of "curtilage:"
"The enclosed space of ground and buildings
immediately surrounding a dwelling-house. In its most
comprehensive and proper legal signification, it includes
all that space of ground and buildings thereon which is
usually enclosed within the general fence immediately
surrounding a principal messuage and outbuildings, and
yard closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be
large enough for cattle to be levant and couchant
therein."18

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id. at 466. Additionally, a Fourth Amendment analysis is outside the scope of
this Article.
17
Id. (emphasis added)
18
Curtilage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (6th ed. 1891) (first alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
15
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For those not familiar with "messuage," it is a property law term
referring to a dwelling and its outbuildings and curtilage.19 For those
not raised in 18th century French farmhouses, "levant and couchant"
refer to the practice of cattle rising up and lying down.20
While humans tend to conduct illegal activities indoors, we
have the outdoorsy moonshine and marijuana-growing businesses to
thank for the evolution of our legal doctrines on privacy and open
fields. In Hester v. United States,21 the Supreme Court explored the
question of whether a person’s zone of privacy extended to the open
fields surrounding a home or farm, an inquiry that would lead to the
creation of the "open fields" doctrine. In 1924, federal agents stood
50-100 yards away from Hester’s farm and observed him handing a
quart bottle to another man.22 The bottle contained home-grown
distilled spirits, illegal in the Prohibition Era.23 On this basis, the
agents subsequently arrested Hester, who claimed in court that they
had trespassed on his property and violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.24
The Court felt no sympathy for Hester, reasoning that if his
fields were readily visible from an adjacent property and the agents
had conducted no physical trespass, the unfortunate moonshiner had
no Fourth Amendment privacy argument to make.25 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes encapsulated the Court’s reasoning, holding that
"the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects', is not extended
to the open fields."26
Thus, "open fields" remained fair game for law enforcement
for decades. First articulated in Hester, the doctrine informed much
of the Supreme Court’s thinking as new technologies came onto the
scene after the turn of the century.
Messuage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) available at Westlaw
BLACKS.
20
Levant and couchant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) available at
Westlaw BLACKS.
21
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
22
Id. at 58.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 59.
19
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PHASE II – WIRETAPPING FROM OLMSTEAD TO KATZ
(1928-1967)

Over a forty-year period, American courts allowed telephone
and broadcast technologies to flourish without scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment—at least in the context of wiretapping-- until
Olmstead v. United States.27 Presiding over the 1928 case of
prominent Seattle bootlegger Roy Olmstead, the Supreme Court
held that federal agents had not conducted a search-and-seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after wiretapping
Olmstead’s telephone line to record his conversations with members
of his illegal liquor distribution operation.28
In 1924, federal agents tapped Olmstead’s phone and took
notes on his conversations. These were then transcribed in a "black
book" that the prosecutor used to charge a total of forty-seven
defendants, including Olmstead’s attorney and his wife Elise.29
Given the unsophisticated technology of the time, the agents could
not see the numbers that Olmstead and his associates were dialing.
To solve this problem, they crossed the tapped phone line with
another line, causing interference.30 Olmstead then had to verbally
instruct the operator which number he wished to dial. The FBI
27

Olmstead, supra note 13; see also Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (18861966) — King of King County Bootleggers, HISTORY LINK (Nov. 13, 2002),
http://www.historylink.org/File/4015. (Olmstead had served on the Seattle
Police force as an enforcer of Seattle’s early prohibition law and later the 18th
Amendment when it came into effect in 1920. Olmstead observed the operations
of the region’s bootleggers and concluded he could do better. After serving a
brief prison sentence for running an alcohol smuggling operation while still a
member of the force, he returned to bootlegging full time, smuggling alcohol
from Canada primarily by small boats to beaches and coves in Washington
State).
28
Olmstead, supra note 13, at 464.
29
See Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (1886-1966) — King of King County
Bootleggers, History Link (Nov. 13, 2002),
http://www.historylink.org/File/4015.
30
Olmstead, supra note 13, at 487.
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agents posted within earshot of his office recorded these numbers in
their notebooks, then did a "reverse look-up" to find the addresses
linked to them.31 After a twenty-four-hour trial, Olmstead was
sentenced to four years of hard labor and fined $8,000.32
The case arrived at the Supreme Court in 1928, when former
President William Howard Taft presided as Chief Justice. Writing
for the Court, Taft demonstrated he had a rudimentary
understanding of telephony by stating that he simply did not see a
Fourth Amendment violation because the government did not
intrude on Olmstead’s physical space: "[t]here was no searching.
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured only by the sense
of hearing. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants."33
The Supreme Court did not decide Olmstead unanimously.
Justice Louis Brandeis examined the facts surrounding the wiretap
and concluded that the federal agents had indeed violated the
Constitution.34 In his dissent, Brandeis inquired, "can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security?"35 Justice Brandeis understood an invasion of
privacy does not require a physical intrusion given the evolution of
modern technology such as telephony.
Six years later, Congress passed the Communications Act in
1934, which explicitly outlawed the practice of wiretapping
telephones without a court warrant.36 However, the Act did not
address the legality of bugs and other forms of electronic
eavesdropping.37
Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court considered
31

See Daryl C. McClary, supra note 29.
Id.
33
Olmstead, supra note 13, at 464.
34
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
35
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§151-622 (1934).
37
See Congressional Research Service, "Privacy: An Overview of Federal
Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Elctronic Eavesropping," Stevens and
Doyle, October 9, 2012: "The Act neither expressly condemned law
enforcement interceptions nor called for the exclusion of wiretap evidence, but it
was read to encompass both, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939)."
32

2017]

REASONABLE ZONES OF PRIVACY

153

whether the FBI had violated a man’s expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment when it tapped a phone booth outside of his
Los Angeles apartment due to suspicion that he was placing illegal
bets on college basketball games.38 In 1967, Charles Katz was in
fact one of the country’s most successful basketball handicappers
and bettors, having evaded persistent law enforcement efforts to
catch him in the act.39 By disabling one phone booth and planting
recording devices on the tops of two others on Sunset Boulevard,
FBI agents managed to overhear his betting conversations with
associates in Miami and Boston.40
There was one flaw with the FBI’s plan: the agents did not
have a search warrant when they intercepted Katz’s conversations.41
As a result, Katz’s attorneys filed an appeal arguing that the
recordings could not be used as evidence against him on Fourth
Amendment grounds.42 Following Olmstead, however, the court of
appeals rejected Katz’s argument, citing the absence of a physical
intrusion into the phone booth itself and ignoring the FBI's elaborate
surveillance scheme in targeting Katz and monitoring his calls via
the two working phone booths.43
Nevertheless, Katz ultimately prevailed. The Supreme Court
ruled 7-1 that Katz was entitled to constitutional protection for his
conversations.44 Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the Court:
"The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
38

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See Matthew Lasar, The crooks who created modern wiretapping law, ARS
TECHNICA (Jun. 2, 2011, 6:47 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2011/06/the-crooks-who-created-modern-wiretapping-law/.
40
Katz at 131.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 133.
43
Id. at 134.
44
Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 359.
39

153

154

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL. 12:2

preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public [e.g., a phone booth] may be constitutionally
protected."45
A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea
of a "reasonable" expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.46
Harlan invented a two-part test for "reasonableness" in this context:
"first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’"47

IV.

PHASE III – OPEN FIELDS AND DRUGS: THE 1980S

As the illegal production of alcohol prompted many open
fields cases in a prior era, several cases in the 1980s reached the
Supreme Court dealing with a new illicit activity that triggered
reflection on meaning of the Fourth Amendment.48 Growing
marijuana in open fields occupied the Court’s attention in the 1984
case of Oliver v. United States.49 Oliver cultivated a marijuana crop
in a field adjacent to his Kentucky property.50 Despite a posted "No
Trespassing" sign, Kentucky State Police parked their vehicle,
walked around a gate and proceeded down a footpath until they
spotted the marijuana plants, about a mile from the gate.51 They
arrested Oliver.52
Once again, the Court found no search-and-seizure, due to
the open nature of the landscape where the illegal growing operation
was situated.53 Seeking to draw a distinction between portions of a
property where an individual or family might have some expectation
45

Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (cultivation of marijuana on
property); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (running a private
chemical plant in a barn on personal property).
49
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
50
Id. at 173.
51
Id.
52
Id..
53
Id. at 184.
46
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of property and other portions where they would not, the Court
reasoned: "open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance."54
Three years later, agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration found a chemical manufacturing plant in a private
barn on private ranch.55 Led by the smell of chemicals and the sound
of a running motor, they skirted several fences—including at least
one spiked with barbed wire—crossed a gate and entered the barn,
where they apprehended their target.56 Although the Court of
Appeals ruled that the barn—surrounded by several fences, was
clearly within the owner’s "curtilage"57—the Supreme Court in
United States v. Dunn disagreed, holding that this area was not
"intimately tied to the home itself."58 Apparently, running a drug lab
is not an intimate family activity.
One might view Hester, Oliver and Dunn as 'result oriented'
rulings, where courts knew that an illegal activity had occurred and
chose to justify the fact that law enforcement failed to get a warrant
by deciding that there is no zone of privacy if the activity is within
'open view' or even in a barn. Before sophisticated surveillance
technology, such rulings posed a threat to moonshiners and pot
growers, but not to the average citizen in terms of government
spying on private activities indoors or outdoors. Privacy is no longer
defined by the parameters of human senses such as vision or hearing,
but now finds a new range of threats based on devices that take the
concept of surveillance to a new plane.59 With the advent of drones,

54

Id. at 179.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987).
56
Id.
57
United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
judgment vacated,467 U.S. 1201, 104 S. Ct. 2380, 81 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984),
and opinion reinstated, 782 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1986).
58
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294.
59
See Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’:
An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1114-28 (1987)
55
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thermal imaging and high-resolution cameras, the game has
changed. "Curtilage" seems like a very quaint notion when a police
officer can operate a bird-sized battery-powered drone and
maneuver it directly over a suspect’s home or outside a window.60
In these cases, law enforcement should simply get a warrant. They
might have been tipped to the location of drug operation by an
informant or other lead, but flying a surveillance drone over the
scene violates any basic "reasonable expectation" of privacy in one’s
property, whether indoors or outdoors.
CONCLUSION
Of all the Supreme Court’s struggles to develop a consistent
doctrine to define a zone of privacy, the Katz formulation makes the
most sense, because privacy rights should travel with the individual.
The inherent vagueness of what is 'reasonable'" in different
situations only creates room for uncertainty, especially as
technology and our cultural norms continue to evolve. Now that the
Fourth Circuit has ruled that no warrant is required for a wireless
carrier to turn location data over to law enforcement, U.S. citizens
live in a ‘Catch-22’ where individuals supposedly have "reasonable
expectations" of privacy in physical spaces, such as phone booths,
but almost no expectation of location privacy when they are using
their cell phones.
With the introduction of new technologies—ranging from
Google Earth aerial photographs to drone surveillance—the
question of where public space ends and private space begins has
reached a critical phase. Deciding the scope of a person’s "zone of
privacy" will be the front-line question for judges and technology
advocates to determine for the next generation. Examining the
colorful and salient cases surveyed above hopefully provides a few
("[T]he presence or absence of a physical intrusion ostensibly ceased to be the
focal point of [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis.").
60
Hope Reese, Police are now using drones to apprehend suspects and
administer non-lethal force: A police chief weighs in, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 25
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/police-are-now-usingdrones-to-apprehend-suspects-and-administer-non-lethal-force-a-police-chief/.
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clues as to the way courts may eventually answer the question of
where privacy begins in the modern world of smart phones and
surveillance technologies.
Given the inherent privacy interest of people as they move
about the world, it seems paramount to address this question. Most
Americans do not have a "reasonable expectation" that law
enforcement can easily discover their whereabouts when making
phone calls or strolling through a mall.61 Further, with the
emergence of data analytics, law enforcement can potentially trace
individuals through the course of a day, whenever they trigger a
safety camera or license plate reader.62 The recent reforms of the
Patriot Act passed in 2015 have pared back the government’s right
to intercept our private communications, but the surveillance
apparatus still exists.63 If we apply different privacy protections to
different technologies, we run the risk of fundamentally eroding our
remaining privacy rights. Despite the march of technology, is it too
much to ask that we can conduct our legal private activities within
reasonable zones of privacy?

61

Simon Hill, Is your smartphone being tracked? We asked an expert, DIGITAL
TRENDS (May 17, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/policehackers-phone-tracking/.
62
Thirteen states have adopted varying limits on retention of automated license
plate reader images. See National Conference of State Legislatures web page,
dated Feb. 27, 2017 and last checked March 7, 2017.
63
Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA
FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23 (2015).
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PRACTICE POINTERS






Keep updated on new legislation. As the privacy
landscape continues to rapidly evolve, we can identify
new ideas for the protection of personal data and
privacy rights, especially at the state and local levels.
Keep up-to-date on new technology. New tools,
platforms and devices may use personally-identifiable
information in innovative ways, which inexorably
creates novel privacy questions. Explore the data
retention practices and policies of the new technologies
you or your clients might adopt for personal use.
Seek answers outside the field of law. Generally,
privacy issues may not be limited to the legal field.
Technology tends to outpace law, and consulting
technology and communications publications will
provide valuable context for considering privacy issues.

